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Abstract
This article explores the relation between innovation and resources that are governed as commons by looking at the govern-
ance of potato genetic resources, especially in the context of the emergence of hybrid diploid potato breeding that will enable 
potato propagation through true seeds. As a new breeding tool, hybrid diploid potato breeding may not only revolutionize 
traditional potato breeding practices, it may also strongly affect current governance modes of potato genetic resources as a 
commons. Contrary to conventional accounts of the commons that treat technological innovation mainly as an exogenous 
factor, we argue that technological innovation can better be understood as an endogenous factor. In particular, we develop 
a co-production framework of innovation and the commons that draws attention to the different ways in which innovation, 
commons and its governance interact. Using this framework, we demonstrate that the constitution of potato genetic resources 
as a commons cannot be understood without considering the various ways in which technological innovation affects resources 
and mediate how these are governed. While reversely, technological innovations themselves are also enabled and constrained 
by users who govern potato genetic resources as a shared resource. We argue that changes in the governance of genetic 
resources can be understood as a change from one socio-technical constellation to another, whereby innovations, resources, 
and institutions are continuously co-produced.
Keywords Commons · Innovation · Genetic resources · Potato · Hybrid breeding · Co-production
Introduction and background
The governance of resources as commons is increasingly 
recognized as a feasible alternative to modes of resource 
governance characterized by dominating top-down govern-
mental control or private ownership. Since the late 1980s, 
a burgeoning body of literature has emerged demonstrating 
the success and versatility of community governance of the 
commons (e.g. Ostrom et al. 1999; Stern et al. 2002; Laer-
hoven and Ostrom 2007). Besides the knowledge commons, 
however, the relation between the commons and innovation 
has largely escaped attention—not only when it comes to 
the way innovation may impact the commons but also how 
resources for innovation can be governed as a commons. 
In a time when it has become increasingly clear that nei-
ther complete governmental control over innovation nor the 
laissez-faire economics of neoliberal markets are without 
problems, it is worth investigating the governance of com-
mons as yet another institutional setting that may interact 
with innovation in diverse ways.
This article explores the relation between the govern-
ance of the commons and innovation by looking at potato 
genetic resources—a genetic resource that is key in potato 
innovation. Potato (Solanum tuberosum L.) is one of the 
world’s most important food crops. Originally hailing from 
the Andes, potato is currently the fifth-largest crop in the 
world in production volume, after sugarcane, maize, wheat, 
and rice (FAO 2015), and is widely expected to gain an even 
more important role in the world’s food supply thanks to its 
relatively healthy nutrient content, low water need, and its 
rather easy cultivation (Haverkort and Struik 2015). In the 
context of food security and the pursuit to realize the UN 
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Sustainable Development Goals, sustained efforts are needed 
to breed improved potato varieties that are less susceptible 
to diseases, can be cultivated in new environments, and are 
more robust in the age of climate change (Haverkort and 
Verhagen 2008). However, developing new potato varieties 
has traditionally been a challenging and time-consuming 
process due to the complex genetic make-up of potatoes.
In recent decades, several technologies have been applied 
to potato breeding that promise to accelerate the process of 
unlocking the genetic diversity in potato, such as genetic 
engineering, molecular marker technology, cis-genesis, and 
more recently gene editing (Jansky et al. 2016; Bethke et al 
2019). This article focuses on the governance of genetic 
resources in the context of another technological innova-
tion: hybrid diploid potato breeding. This innovation makes 
it possible to propagate potatoes not only through tubers but 
also by true seeds, while maintaining genetic uniformity and 
preventing the transfer of diseases to the next generation. 
As 25 g of true potato seed is equivalent to 2.5 tonnes of 
seed tubers, this innovation may also significantly reduce 
transport costs. Moreover, whereas classical potato breed-
ing needs several decades to develop a new variety, this 
new technology may reduce that to 3–6 years, accelerating 
the introduction of new varieties in agricultural practices 
enormously.
Hybrid potato breeding, however, may also affect tradi-
tional tuber propagation systems that govern the availabil-
ity of genetic resource as a commons. In the Netherlands 
for example, a country that holds a share of over 50% of 
the world export of seed potato tubers (Rabobank 2016), 
potato genetic resources have traditionally been widely 
shared within the Dutch potato sector and are governed by 
a set of common rules regarding the use of these resources 
(Almekinders et al. 2014). In recent decades increasing 
commercialization of plant breeding and the advent of new 
biotechnologies as breeding tools have created tensions 
between traditional commons-based modes of governance 
and new forms of appropriation of genetic resources (Visser 
et al. 2019). As a new breeding tool, hybrid diploid potato 
breeding fits in this history, as it may not only revolution-
ize current breeding practices, but also affect the institu-
tional constellations that govern potato genetic resources as 
a commons. Aiming at a more detailed understanding of the 
relation between the commons and innovation, this article 
therefore investigates how hybrid diploid breeding and the 
governance of potato genetic resources interact.
The next section provides a theoretical introduction for 
exploring the relation between the commons and innovation, 
followed by a further specification of the research questions 
that will guide the analysis in this article.
Commons and innovation
A commons refers to “a shared resource, co-governed by 
a community of users according to their rules and norms” 
(Bollier 2014). In a broad sense, commons can thus be 
understood as resources that are governed in a way that 
“exceeds the division between public and private” (Ter-
ranova 2015, p. 9). For a long time the standard idea 
in economics was that commons, especially so-called 
common-pool resources that are depletable and widely 
accessible, are subject to the ‘tragedy of the commons’ 
(Hardin 1968). This so-called collective action problem 
builds upon the classical economic view of humans as 
self-interested individuals under the assumption that eve-
ryone will take what one can and that the resource will 
inevitably be depleted. The prevailing view hence was that 
only top-down governmental intervention or privatization 
could regulate or exclude common-pool resources from 
deterioration and depletion.
Since the 1980s a stream of literature with the late 
Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom as one of the leading 
authors, has countered this view by demonstrating that 
such common-pool resources can be sustainably gov-
erned by communities themselves (e.g. Ostrom et  al. 
1999; Ostrom 2002, 2009; Stern et al. 2002; Laerhoven 
and Ostrom 2007). Based on hundreds of case studies 
in which communities successfully managed to govern 
their common-pool resources in a sustainable manner, 
they discovered institutional arrangements to counteract 
the problems of collective action without resorting to 
either top down governmental regulation or privatization. 
Rather, these arrangements come in many different forms 
and often slowly emerge over time through processes of 
collective learning. The prevalence of such hybrid arrange-
ments of governing even has led some to argue that strong 
top-down governmental control, or privatization (turning 
resources into purely private goods, governed through 
market mechanisms) can be regarded as exceptions, and 
that hybrid forms of community-driven governance are the 
norm (WRR 2012).
Ostrom and colleagues drew upon elaborate empirical 
work to identify so-called design principles and insti-
tutional arrangements that appeared to be important in 
maintaining resources as a commons and to make these 
resources available and accessible to communities of 
users in a sustainable way (Ostrom 1990). These design 
principles particularly draw attention to the importance of 
institutional arrangements in maintaining a resource as a 
commons. They for example stress the relevance of defined 
boundaries and scales for the governance of resources 
and the communities involved, the need of appropriate 
monitoring, sanctioning and conflict resolution, and not 
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in the least, the recognition of the role of the commu-
nity by higher-level authorities. More generally, because 
institutional arrangements can impact the availability and 
accessibility of resources, it follows that a resource that is 
a public good under one institutional arrangement can be a 
common-pool resource (or a club good or a private good) 
under another institutional arrangement.
Plant genetic resources as a commons, whether seeds or 
genetic knowledge, have been extensively discussed from 
this institutional perspective. In particular, plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA) have become 
a subject of global interest and international legal regula-
tion, with the aim to increase their sustainable use and con-
servation and to promote equitable benefit sharing (Hale-
wood et al. 2013). In this process there has been a shift in 
conceptualization from PGRFA as a global public good or 
‘heritage of mankind’, available to everyone without restric-
tion, to conceptualizing PGRFA as a commons, based on 
membership-related benefits and a collective management 
of resources by these members. Moreover, PGRFA have 
been characterized in this literature as a ‘new commons’ 
because of their partially human-made nature as a result of 
a long history of agriculture-related practices of seed selec-
tion, cross-breeding and conservation (Halewood 2013; 
Dedeurwaerdere 2012, 2013). In this context, the technologi-
cal transformations of PGRFA, especially with the rise of 
digital sequence information, has provoked much discussion 
about its implications for the ownership and availability of 
resources and practices of access and benefit sharing (Aubry 
2019; Halewood et al. 2018; Laird and Wynberg 2018; Scott 
and Berry 2016; Welch et al. 2017).
In conceptualizing the commons, we should therefore not 
only focus on the institutional conditions, but also on how 
the availability and accessibility of resources are mediated 
by technological developments. However, in the commons 
literature, technological innovation is largely treated as an 
exogenous variable that has little or no direct impact on the 
constitution of the commons itself. Apart from literature on 
the so-called knowledge commons (Hess and Ostrom 2006; 
Frischmann et al. 2014), only recently a number of studies 
have drawn attention to how technological innovation may 
affect the governance of commons. Such studies have for 
example shown how technological innovations may alter the 
conditions of exploitation of resources and thereby neces-
sitate institutional changes for commons to be maintained 
(Wormbs 2011; Stern 2011).
Others have highlighted how technological innovation 
may itself become a resource that is being governed as a 
commons (Berge and Kranakis 2011; Wormbs 2011; Har-
vey and McMeekin 2010). The case of radio broadcasting 
frequencies is particularly illustrative, as this innovation 
was both a rivalrous resource (it only offered broadcast-
ing space for a limited number of radio stations) and 
non-excludable (users could technically not be barred from 
attempting to broadcast at a particular frequency). This 
initially resulted in “chaos on the ether” (Wormbs 2011, 
p. 93) before institutions emerged for governing radio fre-
quencies as a commons.
Inspired by these approaches we aim to conceptualize 
technological innovation as an endogenous variable in the 
constitution of the commons. In particular we will draw 
upon the framework of co-production of technology and 
society (Jasanoff 2004), an interpretative approach that 
emphasizes that technology and social order are strongly 
intertwined and are shaping each other. On the one hand 
this framework highlights that knowledge and technology 
are not neutral tools but are socially constructed in par-
ticular contexts, while on the other hand, it highlights that 
social order itself is also structured by scientific knowl-
edge and technological artefacts. In short, as Jasanoff sum-
marizes, “knowledge and its material embodiments are at 
once products of social work and constitutive of forms of 
social life” (Jasanoff 2004, p. 2).
From this perspective innovation in crop breeding is on 
the one hand considered as being dependent on govern-
ance arrangements in which genetic resources are made 
available through practices of collection, exchange, and 
conservation. Simultaneously however, on the other hand, 
it recognizes that genetic resources may become incor-
porated in innovations (like new crop varieties or other 
biomaterials) that in turn may strengthen or restrict the 
availability of these resources and thereby affect the social 
order of governing genetic resources as commons (Deibel, 
2013). Innovations in crop breeding are hence impacted 
by institutional arrangements that govern resources as 
commons while simultaneously innovation impacts those 
institutional arrangements.
Contrary to conventional accounts of the commons, this 
perspective of social construction does not provide primacy 
to the nature of resources and the institutions that govern 
them independent from technologies and innovation (i.e. 
treating them as exogenous variables), but instead consid-
ers these resources and institutions as part of socio-technical 
constellations in which social order and technology are con-
tinuously intertwined and co-produced (Jasanoff 2004).
In what follows, we will use this co-production lens on 
the relation between the commons and innovation in a case 
study on potato breeding: we will describe how established 
arrangements of governing potato genetic resources inter-
act with the emerging innovation of hybrid diploid potato 
breeding. Four research questions have guided us in this case 
study (Sects. 4.1–4.4):
1. How are potato genetic resources being governed in the 
Netherlands? To what extent and in what ways are these 
resources made available and accessible as a commons?
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2. How are the availability and accessibility of potato 
genetic resources as commons mediated by innovation 
in general?
3. Using the case of innovation in hybrid diploid potato 
breeding, how is this specific innovation in turn medi-
ated by the availability and accessibility of potato 
genetic resources as commons?
4. What are the implications of hybrid diploid potato 
breeding as an emerging innovation for the availability 
and accessibility of potato genetic resources as com-
mons?
Methodology and sources
With the aim to study the co-production of the commons and 
technological innovation, we have been seeking sources that 
can help to shed light on the nature of genetic resources, the 
institutional rules that govern them, and ongoing technologi-
cal developments in the Netherlands and the wider potato 
world. We collected data in various ways. Firstly, academic 
and grey literature, describing genetic resources and/or inno-
vation in the Dutch potato sector, was systematically gath-
ered by using different search engines, by searching through 
organizational websites and reference lists, and by asking 
interviewees for valuable readings.
Secondly, semi-structured qualitative interviews were 
held with key stakeholders involved in the Dutch potato 
sector (Table 1), including breeding companies, amateur 
breeders, farmers, processing companies, researchers, policy 
makers and non-governmental organizations. A question list 
was prepared covering as much as possible aspects relevant 
to the governance of potato genetic resources and innova-
tion. The interview guide began with broad questions about 
hybrid diploid potato breeding and the potential implications 
of this technology, then moved to more specific questions on 
topics like the accessibility and availability of potato genetic 
resources, the norms and rules governing those resources, 
and the stakeholders that impact and are impacted by those 
norms and rules. In conducting interviews, this list was not 
used as a straitjacket for the order of the questions but rather 
as a guidance and checklist for an otherwise open conversa-
tion that allowed the interviewees to speak frankly.
As an emerging and promising innovation hybrid dip-
loid potato breeding is still developing and its impact is 
hence largely in the future. The potential implications of 
hybrid diploid breeding for the governance of potato genetic 
resources were therefore investigated by systematically 
mapping expectations among those stakeholders that are in 
the best position to judge about these futures (Beumer and 
Edelenbosch 2019). These expectations are salient not only 
because they shed light on how the possible socio-technical 
constellations for governing potato genetic resources may 
look like in the future. They are also relevant in that expecta-
tions about the future may have an effect on the present—i.e. 
they are performative and steer the behaviour of actors in 
anticipation of a changing future (Brown and Michael 2003; 
Borup et al. 2006).
Table 1  List of interviewed actors
Actor Position Date
Start-up seed company Head of research and development 29 March 2016
Start-up seed company Agronomist 14 December 2017
Government ministry Senior policy officer seeds and plant propagation material 29 July 2016
Inspection service Director 16 July 2016
Amateur breeder Also historian of Dutch potato breeding 28 July 2016
Seed tuber farmers Farm owners 28 July 2016
Potato farmer Organic farmer 28 February 2017
Gene bank Curator potato collection 26 February 2016
Agricultural university Emeritus professor of plant breeding, specialized in potato 16 June 2016
Agricultural university Professor of plant breeding, specialized in organic potato 18 May 2016
Agricultural university Professor of plant research, specialized in potato 16 June 2016
Agricultural university Associate professor agricultural technology and social science 2 July 2016
Environmental NGO Campaigner gentech and sustainable agriculture 15 July 2016
Development NGO Programme coordinator soya and livestock 3 March 2017
Trading company Breeder 21 May 2016
Trading cooperation Director of research 30 January 2017
Strawberry trading company Director 1 December 2016
Lobby organization Director 23 June 2016
Processing industry Director of breeding 22 April 2016
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The combination of academic and grey literature, sector 
statistics, and qualitative interviews led to a rich body of 
sources that brought into view the evolving socio-technical 
constellations in the Dutch and wider potato world and it 
allowed information to be verified through triangulation. The 
findings and interpretations were further triangulated at vari-
ous moments by using a panel of experts from the Dutch 
potato sector. This expert panel was part of our research 
project funded by the Dutch science foundation (NWO) and 
included key stakeholders from breeding companies, govern-
ment, civil society organizations, regulatory agencies and 
universities. Several presentations on the topic of this paper 
were given during meetings of the expert panel with elabo-
rate time for comments and discussions.
Results
How are potato genetic resources being governed 
in the Netherlands?
The Dutch potato sector can be divided into three main parts 
(see Fig. 1): trading companies that breed new varieties and 
produce seed tubers as starting material for cultivation (the 
breeding sector), farmers who cultivate, i.e. they vegetatively 
replicate these tubers and produce seed and ware potatoes 
for the market (multiplication and production sector), and 
companies that deliver potatoes to supermarkets for con-
sumption or process them into products like fries or chips or 
starch (processing and retail sector). These sectors are sup-
ported, informed, and regulated by publicly funded research 
institutions, national and international agencies and policies, 
and by consumers and non-governmental organizations (Van 
Dijk et al. 2016).
Potato genetic resources are predominantly used for 
developing new varieties by so-called trading houses. These 
companies specialize in developing new varieties both for 
Dutch ware growers and for export markets worldwide of so-
called ‘seed potatoes’ (which are actually tubers and should 
not be confused with true potato seeds). Five large trading 
houses take up most of the market in the Netherlands, and all 
trading houses together annually export over 800,000 tonnes 
of seed tubers, amounting to about 60% of the world’s total 
potato export (Tönjes 2016).
Besides the trading houses, potato genetic resources are 
also used by amateur breeders, by scientists from public uni-
versities, and occasionally by the processing industry. The 
resources are governed by a set of practices, rules and norms 
that ensures that they are widely available and accessible to 
the breeders. Genetic resources are for example freely acces-
sible, although bounded by a contract, through the Dutch 
gene bank, an institute specialized in maintaining genetic 
resources from around the world. Under the In Trust Agree-
ments (ITAs) on acquisition and distribution of germplasm 
by institutes of the Consultative Group for International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR), actors around the world 
can freely access genetic material held in international gene 
banks (Byerlee and Dubin 2010). Gene banks are therefore 
widely considered as key institutes in maintaining the acces-
sibility of genetic resources (Galluzzi et al. 2016; De Jonge 
2008).
Although the adoption of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity in 1992 has resulted in a virtual stop in the col-
lection of new wild and local varieties, the Dutch gene bank 
has a large collection of material that was gathered prior 
to 1992 (interview 26 February 2017; see also Halewood 
et al. 2013). This gene bank is housed at Wageningen Uni-
versity and Research (WUR) and stores over 2800 potato 
populations. Research and maintaining the freezers and 
fields to preserve the collections are mainly funded by the 
government. Trading houses contribute 10% of the budget, 
in recognition of the value of free access to these materials 
(interview 26 February 2017). Trading houses further pro-
vide occasionally contributions in kind by multiplying gene 
bank populations to ensure their maintenance and accessibil-
ity (interview 26 February 2017).
Genetic resources are further made available and acces-
sible through practices of sharing within the community 
of breeders of newly developed varieties. Access to com-
petitors’ varieties for breeding purposes is legally ensured 
through Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBRs). Like patents, this 
form of property rights affords a temporary monopoly to 
Fig. 1  The organizational 
landscape for potato breeding in 
the Netherlands (Van Dijk et al. 
2016)
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the breeder who has developed a new variety, thus pro-
viding an incentive for investing in innovative activities. 
Unlike patents, however, breeders’ rights allow competitor 
breeders to use these varieties for the development of new 
varieties free of costs and rights. This, so-called breeders’ 
exemption ensures that once a variety has been granted 
breeders’ rights or released in the market, the genetic 
material is freely available for developing new varieties 
by others (Smith et al. 2016; UPOV 1991).
Breeders’ rights are granted by (inter)governmental 
agencies, based on the guidelines of the International 
Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV), an intergovernmental organization that was 
established in 1961. As of February 2020, the Union 
counts 76 members, including most Western countries, 
China and Russia, the European Union and the African 
Intellectual Property Organization. Its aim is to encour-
age the development of improved plant varieties through 
providing temporary property rights to breeders. The con-
ditions for granting such rights are the novelty of a new 
variety, as well as its distinctness, uniformity, and stability 
(DUS criteria).
In the Netherlands the implementation of these rules is 
partly ensured by the Dutch General Inspection Service 
(abbreviated in Dutch as ‘NAK’). This is a semi-govern-
mental agency established in the early twentieth century 
when farmers and trading houses felt the need for a reliable 
quality standard that could help the export of starting mate-
rial (interview 16 July 2016). The NAK plays a key role 
in the Dutch potato sector as it provides valuable quality 
marks to tuber batches and it collaborates with Dutch Food 
and Consumer Products Safety Authority ensuring compli-
ance with sanitary and phytosanitary measures. The NAK 
also performs research to substantiate the granting of plant 
breeders’ rights to new varieties by the Dutch Ministry of 
Agriculture.
In case of violation of plant breeders’ rights, a resolution 
is initially sought amongst the conflicting parties, but parties 
can also go to court to stop presumed violation, charging to 
pay compensation for the damages and even occasionally 
putting criminal charges for serious violations of the rights 
(Agentschap 2011). The value of maintaining plant breeders’ 
rights is widely recognized by the trading houses, who have 
long taken a dismissive stance towards patenting of plant 
genetic material, as this would obstruct the wide availability 
of genetic resources.
In practice the sharing of potato genetic resources goes 
even further. For instance at periodic farmers’ markets, 
where breeding houses display their latest work, it is com-
mon practice to share both the information and genetic 
material with competitors well-before breeders’ rights are 
obtained (interview 29 July 2016). While breeders thus 
may disclose valuable information and resources to their 
competitors, they also stand to the benefit from learning 
about the developments made by others.
The sector-wide practice to share genetic material is 
also illustrated by the collaboration of the trading houses 
with collectives of so-called amateur-breeders: experienced 
potato farmers with a passion for potato breeding and a keen 
‘breeders’ eye’, who help breeding companies in selecting 
favourable and strong plants in the field that are suitable 
for further breeding. These farmer-breeders receive potato 
tubers from the trade companies and work on a no-cure no-
pay basis, receiving income only after a variety that they 
helped to develop is registered and marketed. Depending 
on the contract, license fees are then divided between the 
farmer-breeder and trading house (Lammerts van Bueren 
and van Loon 2011). However, if one of these farmer-breed-
ers breaks the contract and shares genetic material entrusted 
to them by the trading houses with outsiders there are severe 
sanctions (interview 28 July 2016; interview 30 January 
2017). This collaboration between trading houses and col-
lectives of farmer-breeders is a rather unique feature of the 
Dutch potato breeding sector (Almekinders et al. 2014). As 
a collaborative and rather open practice of potato breeding it 
resembles the concept of ‘collective invention’ (Allen 1983), 
which is characterized by incremental improvements, the 
sharing of information, and by being embedded in practical 
experience.
Nevertheless, there are clear boundaries to these shar-
ing practices. Interviewees for instance made it clear that 
breeding information and materials are only shared amongst 
breeders within the Netherlands, given past incidents 
whereby genetic material was obtained by people from coun-
tries where it is nearly impossible to monitor whether plant 
breeders’ rights are respected, and where varieties may be 
marketed as their own (interview 30 January 2017). Moreo-
ver, very strict phytosanitary measures create major obsta-
cles to the import of potato genetic materials from outside 
the European Union, which means that the circulation of 
such materials remains limited mainly to breeders within 
EU countries (personal communication Dutch potato breeder 
2020).
Our discussion of the governance of potato genetic 
resources shows how these resources, through both formal 
institutional arrangements and informal practices, are made 
widely available and accessible to the community of breed-
ers in the Dutch potato sector. Thus, in terms of Ostrom’s 
design principles, we can conclude that in the Netherlands 
these genetic resources are maintained as a commons, char-
acterized by clearly defined boundaries, rules regarding the 
appropriation and provision of resources (including ITAs, 
PBRs and mutual obligations between trading houses and 
farmer breeders), informal practices of sharing and collabo-
ration, and mechanisms of conflict resolution, using a scale 
of graduated sanctions through a semi-autonomous agency, 
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indicating that higher-level authorities recognize the self-
determination of the community (see Ostrom 2009).
How are potato genetic resources as commons 
mediated by technological innovation?
Thus far, we focused in our discussion of the Dutch potato 
sector on the institutional arrangements that are important in 
maintaining genetic resources as a commons. However, the 
co-production framework suggests that the possibility to use 
potato genetic material for breeding new varieties does not 
only depend on the institutional availability and accessibility 
of these materials, but increasingly also on techno-scientific 
knowledge and skills that enable breeders to unlock genetic 
material as a new resource. In the case of potato, this is 
a particularly challenging process. Conventional breeding 
proceeds by crossing two parent plants each with desirable 
traits. In potato, such crosses produce highly heterogeneous 
offspring because of the potato’s tetraploid genome. It is not 
uncommon for breeders to start with several hundreds of 
thousands of seedlings per crossing, which are then brought 
down to a few varieties by selecting the best contenders 
every growing season. This requires very particular skills 
and the entire process can take up to several decades.
The gene bank is particularly illustrative of the fact that 
the institutional availability and accessibility of genetic 
resources does not automatically mean that these resources 
can easily be unlocked. The available resources at the gene 
bank largely consist of seeds from wild relatives of the cul-
tivated potato, which are valued for the possible presence 
of traits that cannot be found in cultivated potato varieties. 
But these potato species often are highly heterogeneous. 
For example, a species containing a wanted resistance gene 
may simultaneously be small, bumpy, and sour—traits that 
must be eliminated through a lasting breeding process. As 
in many other crops, isolating valuable potato genetic mate-
rial from wild plants thus requires a collective and highly 
time-consuming effort. However, the efforts through which 
these genetic resources can be unlocked are also founded 
on an increasing scientific understanding and technological 
control of potato genetics. Whereas breeders traditionally 
need to rely on their breeders’ eye to select plants with desir-
able traits, innovation in biotechnology and genetics makes 
it possible to shift the selection process from the phenotype 
to the genotype, i.e. from the plant in the field to the DNA in 
the plant, which increases the speed and precision of breed-
ing. Large breeding companies with their own molecular 
labs now extensively use genetic marker technology for iden-
tifying plantlets with favourable genes.
To stimulate the development and sharing of new 
knowledge, skills and materials that may help to unlock 
potato genetic resources, the Dutch government undertook 
occasional attempts to strengthen collaboration between 
universities and trading houses by providing partial funding 
for initiatives that may not have been feasible for single com-
panies or farmer–breeders to organize. For example, over the 
last two decades, the Ministry of Economic Affairs initiated 
two large research projects to develop potato varieties that 
are resistant to late blight, a disease that is a major culprit 
to potato growers around the world (Haverkort et al. 2009; 
Lammerts van Bueren et al. 2008; Lammerts van Bueren 
and Hutten 2012). The importance of such practices of 
collaboration and sharing is widely acknowledged by both 
the public and the private sector and is generally seen as 
a key ingredient in the success of the Dutch potato sector 
worldwide.
To be sure, in the past the government took responsibility 
for such ‘pre-breeding’ activities through the public funding 
of plant breeding research, but gradually retreated from this 
responsibility, shifting breeding activities from the public 
to the private domain. However, instead of funding research 
that can subsequently be appropriated by private parties, 
as is the case in many other contemporary public–private 
research partnerships (e.g. Mirowski 2011), contemporary 
collaborations in Dutch potato breeding proceed under the 
condition that all trading houses which participate in the 
research process will continue to have access to the newly 
unlocked genetic material, thereby ensuring the availability 
and accessibility of this material as a commons.
Not all technological developments were institutionally 
embedded in ways that unambiguously strengthened the 
commons, however. With the rise of genomics as a new 
innovative field of research, the Dutch government like-
wise funded public–private partnerships focusing on ‘pre-
competitive’ research, including the Centre for BioSystems 
Genomics (CBSG, 2002–2012) which had the aim to unravel 
the genetic code of the potato and other agricultural crops. 
In this role the CBSG was involved in the international 
initiative of the Potato Genome Sequencing Consortium, 
providing a public platform which makes potato sequence 
data accessible to the scientific community at large (PGSC 
2011). In the context of genomics innovation however, the 
support of public–private partnerships by the Dutch gov-
ernment went hand in hand with the promotion of intellec-
tual property rights by patenting, reflecting a more general 
trend in plant biotechnology, genomics and commercially 
driven plant breeding, and also raising the question how to 
balance protection with sharing for the common good (De 
Jonge 2008; Kloppenburg 2004; Jefferson et al. 2015; Bonny 
2017). This tension between unlocking and appropriating 
genetic resources also recurs in the governance of the new 
informational and molecular genetic capacities embodied 
in the growth of digital sequence information (Visser et al. 
2019). Whereas the CGIAR global governance system of 
gene banks traditionally focuses on genetic materials as 
physical resources, the growing pool of digital sequence 
 K. Beumer et al.
1 3
information creates new governance challenges requiring 
a tailored ‘new commons’ approach, to be adjusted to the 
‘dematerialized’ status of genetic resources (Aubry 2019; 
Halewood et al. 2018).
These developments illustrate the relevance of our co-
production perspective, according to which potato genetic 
resources are constituted as a commons through continuous 
interactions between institutions governing it and techno-
logical innovations affecting the availability and nature of 
these resources. Indeed, contemporary practices of potato 
breeding cannot be understood apart from the role of vari-
ous technologies, including high-tech genomics tools as well 
as more mundane technologies. Thus, conventional breed-
ing practices, that work with several hundreds of thousands 
seedlings per crossing as genetic starting material, are aided 
by specially fine-tuned tractors for planting the seedlings; 
the genetic traits that trading houses and farmer-breeders 
select for are informed by the requirements of the processing 
machines used by potato chips factories (interview 22 April 
2016); and even the freezers used to store genetic resources 
in the gene bank are themselves a technology that enables 
and constrains the way the commons can be governed (Radin 
and Kowal 2017).
By the same token, the perspective of co-production can 
also help us to understand several developments that put 
pressure on the commons, like the reorientation of govern-
mental programs promoting pre-competitive breeding and 
the restrictions for worldwide circulation of wild varieties 
following the adoption of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity. Whereas conventional accounts of the commons 
would describe these developments primarily as institu-
tional changes in the governance of the commons, from a 
co-production perspective these developments should be 
understood as changes driven by the interaction between 
governance arrangements and technological innovation. For 
instance, the expectation that countries could earn money 
from genetic resources over which the Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity gave them sovereign rights, which subse-
quently led to a steep drop in the free donation of novel 
wild varieties, cannot be understood apart from advances 
in biotechnology that enabled new forms of unlocking 
genetic material. Just because these technological advances 
promised novel ways to extract value from biological mate-
rial, especially in the pharmaceutic sector, countries did 
change the practices and institutions for maintaining genetic 
resources as a commons.
The case of hybrid diploid potato breeding: genetic 
resources as a commons
The co-production perspective thus allows us to see that 
the constitution of potato genetic resources as a commons 
cannot be understood without considering the various ways 
in which technological innovations mediate – enable and 
constrain – how resources are governed and unlocked. 
Reversely, the co-production perspective also suggests that 
innovations themselves are enabled and constrained by the 
context in which they are developed, in this case one where 
a community of users governs potato genetic resources as a 
shared resource.
In this section we discuss hybrid diploid potato breed-
ing as a case, with the aim to show more in detail how in 
(Dutch) potato breeding innovation is mediated by genetic 
resources as a commons. A first step in hybrid breeding is 
repetitive self-fertilization of plants (‘inbreeding’) in order 
to create ‘homozygous’ offspring lines. Within these lines 
the homologous chromosomes, originating from the male 
and female parent, are identical. The next step is to make 
crossings between different well-characterized homozygous 
(parent) lines, by which specific genetic features can be pre-
cisely and quickly combined into new ‘hybrid’ varieties. In 
the twentieth century the principles of hybrid breeding have 
been applied to an increasing number of crops like corn, 
rice, sugar beet, and tomato, and the technology was one of 
the key innovations driving the Green Revolution (Duvick 
2009).
However, until recently, hybrid breeding was not prac-
tical in potatoes because the cultivated potato genome is 
tetraploid, meaning there are four homologous chromo-
somes instead of two, making the creation of homozygous 
inbred lines highly difficult and time-consuming. A possible 
approach would be to move to diploid potatoes, but these are 
self-incompatible, i.e. they have a mechanism that prevents 
self-fertilization and therefore inbreeding. Yet, in the past 
ten years, the Dutch start-up potato seed company Solynta 
(solynta.com: see also Table 1) has succeeded in developing 
a diploid hybrid potato breeding program by overruling this 
self-incompatibility in diploid potato plants (Lindhout et al. 
2011). As authors of this article, we were in the position to 
closely follow the development of this innovation for sev-
eral years through a collaborative project with this company, 
aiming to investigate strategies for responsible innovation in 
Dutch potato breeding (POTAREI 2015–2020).
This innovation of using self-compatible diploid potatoes 
to create hybrids is described both by outside observers and 
the company itself as a “revolutionary technique” and a “par-
adigm shift” in potato breeding (interview environmental 
NGO 15 July 2016; Solynta 2016; Beumer and Edelenbosch 
2019). The innovation is expected to increase the precision 
and speed of breeding as well as to enable the propagation of 
potatoes through hybrid seed instead of tubers, thus prevent-
ing the transfer of tuber-bound diseases and strongly reduc-
ing transport costs (Lindhout et al. 2011; Stokstad 2019).
The development of this new innovation in potato breed-
ing may not only help to unlock the large genetic vari-
ety of potato as a resource, it is also highly dependent on 
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the availability and accessibility of these potato genetic 
resources as a commons. For example a key step in devel-
oping this innovation was making use of diploid germplasm. 
This was made available by a pre-breeding program from 
Wageningen University and is available as well from potato 
gene banks and other public research institutes (Lindhout 
et al. 2018; see also Lindhout et al. 2011). Another key 
step was to overrule self-incompatibility of potato plants, 
which was again based on a freely available genetic resource. 
Already in the late 1990s and early 2000s, researchers in 
Japan reported on a gene that could render diploid potatoes 
self-compatible (Hosaka and Hanneman 1998). This so-
called Sli gene originates from a wild potato variety that is 
widely distributed in the Andes. Although this genetic mate-
rial currently falls under the 1992 Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity and hence can no longer be accessed without 
prior agreement from national governments, it is available 
from international gene banks and also circulating among 
researchers and companies worldwide. Thus it was donated 
to Solynta’s researchers by one of the Japanese authors 
of the 1998 paper on the Sli gene (Lindhout et al. 2011). 
Without the public and worldwide availability and acces-
sibility of these crucial resources, it seems highly unlikely 
that Solynta’s innovation could have been developed in its 
current form.
It was highlighted in the previous section that the con-
stitution of potato genetic resources as a commons does 
not only depend on the institutional availability and acces-
sibility of these resources but also on the skills, knowledge, 
and technologies required for unlocking genetic material. 
This is also the case with the development of hybrid potato 
breeding, as key steps in the development of hybrid true 
seed potatoes are enabled by skills, knowledge, and tech-
nologies that were previously made widely available (see 
for example the CGIAR Generation Challenge Programme). 
One example are molecular ‘markers’—specific sequences 
of DNA—which can be used to identify the presence of par-
ticular genes in the plant. In the context of hybrid breeding 
markers are used to test the level of homozygosity in inbred 
parent lines and molecular markers can also be used to select 
parent lines for particular beneficial (combinations of) genes 
or to predict more accurately the breeding value of these 
lines. Furthermore, although the library of inbred parent 
lines developed by the Solynta company may already har-
bour many important traits for potato breeding, new favour-
able traits can be introduced into these lines by so-called 
marker-assisted introgression breeding. To this end, parent 
lines are crossed with a diploid potato plant carrying a spe-
cific gene of interest. In the subsequent selection process 
parent lines containing this gene can be identified with the 
help of molecular markers at an early stage of growth, thus 
significantly increasing the precision and speed of breeding. 
In this way, the Solynta company successfully introduced, 
within a couple of years, pest resistance genes in their exper-
imental hybrid varieties (Lindhout et al. 2018).
Molecular markers were hence crucial to the develop-
ment of hybrid potato breeding, yet the availability of these 
tools in general, and the genetic knowledge necessary to 
employ them, have been the result of public–private initia-
tives like the Potato Genome Sequencing Consortium. These 
projects made genetic maps and full genomic sequences pub-
licly available as tools enabling the identification, mapping, 
isolation and functional analysis of useful genes (Lindhout 
et al. 2011). As an international group of public and private 
sector scientists noted, by “reinventing the potato crop at the 
diploid level”, hybrid potato breeding enables breeders “to 
take full advantage of the modern genetics and genomics 
tools available to improve gain from selection” (Jansky et al. 
2016, p. 2). Indeed, the wide availability and accessibility of 
genomic information and tools are crucially important for 
the power, precision and speed of hybrid breeding technol-
ogy, as the use of markers clearly show.
Implications of hybrid breeding for the governance 
of potato genetic resources
In the previous sections we argued that the governance of 
potato genetic resources as a commons is mediated by tech-
nological innovations, and that innovations like hybrid dip-
loid breeding, in turn are mediated by both genetic resources 
and techno-scientific knowledge and skills governed as a 
commons. In this section we move back again the co-pro-
duction swing and explore how hybrid breeding—itself 
enabled by the genetic resources commons—may produce 
changes in the governance of potato genetic resources. As 
we have seen above, hybrid potato breeding is expected to 
be a “game changer” (interview government 29 July 2016; 
Stokstad 2019) that could potentially “change the power bal-
ance in the entire sector” (interview environmental NGO 15 
July 2016). In other words, the introduction of hybrid potato 
breeding should be seen as a process of social-technical 
change that also may have implications for the governance 
of potato genetic resources as a commons. However, as the 
development of this innovation is still in its infancy, our dis-
cussion below of the changes it could bring will necessarily 
be mostly forward-looking and explorative.
In crops like maize, tomato, and sugar beet, the shift from 
conventional to hybrid breeding has historically been associ-
ated with increasing protection and corporate appropriation 
of knowledge and commercial marketing of seeds around 
the world. As a result of this process of commodification, 
farmers have gradually lost control over their seeds (Klop-
penburg 2004; Borowiak 2004; Deibel 2013; Bonny 2017). 
Although this development is far from unique for hybrid 
breeding, hybrid crops afford breeding companies a special 
in-built economic protection. As seeds from hybrids will 
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lose their uniformity and vigour, farmers cannot use them for 
the next growing season and have to buy new hybrid seeds 
every season (Brown and Caligari 2008).
Hybrids enable a company to apply a ‘natural patent’, so 
to say. For potatoes, however, this is not strictly the case, 
because this crop can be propagated vegetatively. Farmers 
can therefore simply multiply hybrid potatoes by planting 
the tubers they have produced from the seeds. These tubers 
will produce completely identical progeny, hence maintain-
ing the desirable traits of the hybrid variety. Nevertheless, 
farmers who would like to grow hybrid potatoes will still be 
advised, just as with the conventional tuber-based system, 
to regularly buy new seed as tuber-based reproduction may 
stack diseases in subsequent generations, resulting in lower 
yields.
Hybrid breeding may, however, affect the availability 
and accessibility of potato genetic resources to breeders. 
When hybrid diploid potato varieties become available 
on the market, they will in principle be accessible to other 
breeders who are allowed to use these varieties for further 
breeding under the breeders’ exemption. And as it is widely 
expected that hybrid breeding will enable genetic material 
to be unlocked with more power, precision and speed, it 
may result in a higher turn-over of potato varieties and the 
use of more ‘distant’ genetic resources in breeding. Thus, 
it may enhance the availability of potato genetic material 
which can also be readily used by competing hybrid potato 
breeders to improve their own diploid parental lines. But 
it will not be directly available for improving conventional 
tetraploid varieties. Conventional breeders first need to turn 
a hybrid diploid variety into a tetraploid variety by duplicat-
ing the chromosomes through a demanding technical proce-
dure before it can be crossed with their tetraploid material. 
Therefore hybrid diploid varieties will be less accessible as 
a genetic resource for breeders traditionally working with 
tetraploid potato crops.
At first sight, the potential implications of hybrid dip-
loid potato breeding for the governance of genetic resources 
thus seem to be fairly limited and mixed. It may first of all 
lead to a further unlocking of potato genetic resources that 
will become available in improved varieties. Farmers may 
profit from these varieties and may still propagate, share 
or trade the seed in the form of tubers. Breeders may use 
these varieties for further breeding based on the breeders’ 
exemption, but for conventional potato breeders this might 
be technically more challenging, if not prohibitive. In other 
words, as a new innovation hybrid diploid potato breeding 
may affect the accessibility of genetic resources both posi-
tively and negatively, whereby the impediments are rather 
technical than institutional.
In one respect, however, the introduction of hybrid breed-
ing entails a crucially important institutional change in the 
governance of potato genetic resources. Companies involved 
in hybrid breeding have to make huge investments in the 
development of inbred (parental) lines as the main building 
blocks for their own business. In a fully developed hybrid 
system, new varieties may be produced rather rapidly, but 
the creation of a sufficient collection of homozygous paren-
tal lines is a highly expensive and time-consuming process. 
Indeed, as a start-up company, Solynta was able to register 
its first hybrid variety only after 15 years of R&D (personal 
communication Solynta breeder). Hybrid breeding firms, 
therefore, generally consider parental lines as their main eco-
nomic asset and, accordingly, the Solynta company has taken 
strict measures to ensure that access to their parental lines is 
restricted, keeping them carefully secret from the breeding 
community. As we have seen, in conventional practices of 
Dutch potato breeding sharing is the rule, even including 
the informal exchange of breeding materials with potential 
economic value. However, whereas conventional breeders 
may safely exchange such materials knowing that it will 
take a long and uncertain effort to include these materials 
in new varieties, it would take competitors only a few years 
to develop new hybrid varieties, if they could indeed freely 
obtain mature parental lines as breeding material. Hybrid 
breeders are hence likely to think twice before sharing such 
genetic material.
The role of patents further demonstrates how the new 
importance of parental lines may change the governance of 
potato genetic resources as commons. As a new category 
of highly valuable potato genetic material, one way to pro-
tect these parental lines is patenting. Initially the Solynta 
company indeed sought to ensure profitability from its large 
investments in a hybrid breeding program by filing a pat-
ent on the technology used to create inbred parent lines. In 
this context, it made serious efforts to make other actors 
enthusiastic about hybrid breeding, also sharing informa-
tion about the technology to other breeding firms (Beumer 
and Edelenbosch 2019). However, while a patent has been 
granted to the company in a number of countries outside the 
European Union, in Europe their patent application remained 
unsuccessful because of the new EU patent regulation that 
puts a ban on patents concerning natural materials and the 
materials to produce them (interview seed company 14 
December 2017; European Patent Office 2017). Now that 
the technology can no longer be patented in the EU, the 
company is more reticent to share information about how to 
create a diploid hybrid potato breeding program. Although 
the company has shared information about its R&D activi-
ties in a number of scientific publications, it will not go into 
much further detail in their communication and contacts 
about its breeding program, while keeping secret its paren-
tal lines (interview seed company 29 March 2016). Indeed, 
as a representative from a Dutch potato trading cooperation 
noted, informal requests for information and material, which 
in the Netherlands are very common among conventional 
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potato breeders, are now considered by the Solynta company 
only on the condition of signing a confidentiality statement 
(interview trading cooperation 30 January 2017). Thus, the 
paradoxical outcome of the European ban on patents might 
be that it may actually have become harder for potato breed-
ing companies to get access to the technology for hybrid 
breeding.
What future developments can we envisage for hybrid 
potato breeding in this context, and what could be the 
implications of these developments for the governance of 
genetic resources? As hybrid breeding is further getting off 
the ground, potato breeders may more and more compete 
on the basis of proprietary parental lines, considering their 
lines as a trade secret and probably also applying for patents 
on genetic traits that may further limit the access to genetic 
materials (Louwaars 2018). This may thus result in high 
entry barriers for newcomers in the field. As the owner-
ship of such precious parent lines has high economic value, 
hybrid potato breeding might lead to a series of mergers and 
acquisitions in the potato value chain, akin to the mergers 
and acquisitions previously witnessed in the seed sector of 
other crops (Bonny 2017; Duvick 2009). Pushing the argu-
ment further, this could create a situation where a handful 
of corporate seed players gains sufficient size and capital 
needed to privately undertake the large-scale research efforts 
that currently still require commons-based collaboration and 
government coordination. This is in line with Allen’s (1983) 
suggestion that traditions of collective invention disappear 
when costs of innovation rise in the context of the rise of 
costly R&D facilities, knowledge protection, and the appear-
ance of big companies.
Clearly, this is not to say that hybrid breeding necessar-
ily (and only) results in private enclosure of potato genetic 
resources. The parental lines also create opportunities for 
new sharing arrangements, for example, and several insti-
tutions and practices for doing so are already emerging. 
The earlier mentioned developments in the field of genom-
ics may, for example, strengthen an innovation dynamic 
in which genetic maps, sequences and markers are widely 
shared, enabling breeders to target valuable genes in avail-
able conventional or hybrid potato crops, and to incorporate 
these genes in their own varieties. As a result, modern breed-
ing, including hybrid breeding, may increasingly require the 
establishment of new collaborations, combining the skills of 
the breeder with the in-depth knowledge of plant scientists 
and geneticists (Lindhout et al. 2018; Jansky et al. 2016; 
Halewood et al. 2018). As we described earlier, in con-
ventional potato breeding the breeders’ eye was of crucial 
importance in selecting the right varieties from a huge stock 
of plants, a skill that is mostly possessed by experienced 
potato farmers, and that has resulted in various collective 
sharing arrangements between farmer-breeders and breeding 
companies. Such traditional practices of sharing within the 
community of potato breeders may now, however, lose sig-
nificance. Instead, hybrid potato breeding may lead to new 
sharing arrangements, drawing new actors in the commons, 
while excluding more traditional ones.
It is in this context, that the Solynta company, in stark 
contrast with its policy of keeping secret parental lines, 
recently took the step to release a complete genome sequence 
of one of its highly homozygous parental lines which, under 
specific conditions, is made available for the research com-
munity, together with the relevant plant material (Solynta 
2019). The sequencing was done in collaboration with the 
department of Plant Breeding at Wageningen University 
& Research (WUR) and partly financed by PepsiCo. The 
company expects that through this public–private partner-
ship, useful potato genetic traits will be explored and utilized 
more widely and quickly, taking full advantage of the hybrid 
breeding technology and contributing to a more sustainable 
potato production.
Discussion
In the foregoing, we have demonstrated that technological 
innovation can best be understood as an endogenous vari-
able that not only affects the commons and its governance 
but that, reversely, is also shaped by the commons and its 
governance. Using this perspective, we have been able to 
foreground the complex interaction between the governance 
of potato genetic resources in the Netherlands, and the inno-
vation of hybrid diploid potato breeding.
This perspective also enables us to identify several nor-
mative issues that emerge from the co-production of hybrid 
potato breeding and the governance of potato genetic 
resources, which we would like to turn to now. In our anal-
ysis, we identified a potential tension between two differ-
ent kinds of dynamics, i.e. between corporate-based and 
commons-based modes of governance of genetic resources, 
which may both shape the future of hybrid potato breed-
ing. The first mode of governance is driven by market-
based forms of research and protection of potato genetic 
resources and by corporate consolidation of hybrid diploid 
breeding – as we have seen for example in the tendency to 
keep parental lines secret. The second mode of governance 
is instead driven by the sharing of knowledge and materials, 
and by collaboration to strengthen the knowledge base for 
unlocking potato genetic resources through hybrid breed-
ing – as is illustrated by the recent release of a complete 
genome sequence of one of the parental lines of the Solynta 
company.
This tension between corporate- and commons-based 
modes of governance also raises normative questions about 
the goals that are pursued in breeding, especially in rela-
tion to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as the 
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two modes of governance have different implications for 
the potential contribution of hybrid potato breeding to the 
SDGs. Advocates of both modes of governance argue that 
hybrid potato breeding can positively contribute to global 
food security and more climate resilient agriculture, as 
hybrid potato breeding programs can increase the speed 
with which the “tremendous wealth of germplasm” can be 
unlocked (Lindhout et al. 2018, p. 103). For example, the 
Solynta company mentions on its website the potentially 
important role for hybrid diploid potato breeding in advanc-
ing a number of SDGs. Literature about potato farming in 
Africa, however, has clearly shown that innovative technolo-
gies often do not fit to poor farmers’ reality (Gildemacher 
et al. 2009) and that the introduction of high quality seeds 
often fails to address the needs of many resource-poor small-
holder farmers in developing countries (Almekinders et al. 
2019). In response to this mismatch other innovation strate-
gies have been proposed, emphasizing the need to strengthen 
traditional farmers’ practices of seed saving and exchange 
and advocating participatory plant breeding as a strategy that 
may effectively support the maintenance and improvement 
of crop genetic diversity by smallholder farmers (Alme-
kinders et al. 2008).
The message we can take from this discussion is that we 
cannot leave the development of hybrid potato breeding to 
corporate-based governance only. In order to fully reap the 
benefits of this innovation, we will also need commons-
based modes of governance, thus requiring us to thoroughly 
consider the relation between innovation and the commons. 
As Duvick notes, an advantage of public breeding organi-
zations is that they intentionally can allocate scarce genetic 
resources among farmers working in small and exceptional 
adaptation areas, not likely to be served by the private sector 
(Duvick 2009). However, in the case of hybrid diploid potato 
breeding, this can only occur if these organizations engage 
in a collective effort to produce well-developed and publicly 
available diploid parental lines. Interestingly, these views 
and concerns also resonate in the earlier mentioned interna-
tional opinion statement by public and private sector scien-
tists. The authors of the statement point out that “instead of 
expecting each existing cultivar development program to ini-
tiate a diploid breeding program, another option is to plan a 
transition from the polyploid to the diploid breeding system 
as a global community and dedicate some programs, perhaps 
government programs and/or private companies, entirely to 
develop the diploid system” (Jansky et al. 2016, p. 1416).
The implication is that, if we would like hybrid potato 
breeding to be responsive to the major societal challenges 
addressed by the SDGs, we need to think about scenarios in 
which potato genetic resources remain to be governed as com-
mons. One possible scenario is the establishment of hybrid 
breeding consortia, in which parental lines are developed and 
maintained in the public domain as the core genetic resources 
for hybrid breeding programs, where companies have the 
responsibility for crossing the parents, registering and market-
ing hybrid varieties. This scenario has been put into practice 
for a variety of hybrid crops in other sectors. Private sector 
members of such consortia pay an annual fee to get access to 
improved lines, while these lines are available for free to pub-
lic sector institutions for further improvement (López-Noriega 
et al. 2012). Such consortia may also involve farmers’ organi-
zations and cooperatives (Gowda et al. 2009).
Another scenario is based on the concept of participatory 
breeding, which already has a long and well-documented 
history, and has been recognized for increasing the value of 
local genetic resources for smallholder farmers and conserv-
ing crop genetic diversity for future breeding (Li et al. 2014; 
Almekinders et al. 2008; Westengen and Winge 2020). An 
inspiring and rare case of participatory hybrid breeding has 
been described for maize, where public sector breeders rec-
ognized that locally adapted landraces and farmer-improved 
maize varieties were a promising base for further hybrid 
improvement (Li et al. 2013; Song et al. 2016). By close col-
laboration with the local farmers, the breeders were able to 
understand the complex agroecological and socioeconomic 
conditions under which farmers had to work. Considering 
the farmers’ trait and landrace preferences, the breeders 
started a program of hybrid breeding, whereby farmers were 
invited to evaluate and select their most preferred crosses. 
Under an Access and Benefit Sharing agreement, the breed-
ers shared with the farmers the finally selected seeds and 
inbred-lines for community seed production, while the seeds 
were also certified and released for wider exploitation by a 
commercial seed company.
In both scenarios discussed above we see how particu-
lar socio-technical constellations for hybrid potato breed-
ing may soften the potential tension between corporate-
based and commons-based modes of governance of genetic 
resources, and could stimulate innovation in a way that is 
more responsive to the challenges of food security, sustain-
ability and climate change. In their opinion statement Jansky 
et al. (2016) conclude with a call to leaders of public and pri-
vate organizations to come together to explore the implica-
tions of hybrid diploid breeding as a radical and exciting new 
strategy to transform the potato industry. We believe that the 
co-production perspective on innovation and the commons 
developed here, helps to shed light on what exactly is at 
stake regarding the availability and accessibility of potato 
genetic resources.
Conclusion
Contrary to conventional accounts of the commons that 
treat technological innovation as an exogenous factor, we 
have argued that technological innovation can better be 
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understood as an endogenous factor intertwined with gov-
ernance, accessibility, and excludability of the commons. 
We have proposed the perspective of co-production as a 
fruitful way to understand the interaction between techno-
logical innovation and the commons. This has important 
implications for studying the governance of potato genetic 
resources as commons. First, from our co-production per-
spective, both the resources itself and the institutions that 
govern them should be understood as part of socio-tech-
nical constellations. This has already been hinted at in the 
literature about plant genetic resources mentioned before, 
in which these resources are considered as a ‘new com-
mons’ in the context of changing technologies available 
for unlocking genetic material (Halewood 2013; Halewood 
et al. 2018). The governance of a resource as commons is 
thus partly mediated by technological innovations. In this 
respect our approach differs from conventional accounts 
of the commons which provide primacy to the nature of 
resources and the institutions that govern them apart from 
technologies (i.e. as exogenous variables).
In our perspective, innovation is not merely affecting 
the commons, but commons conversely also affect innova-
tion. Our understanding of science and technology as part 
of socio-technical constellations implies that technologi-
cal innovations developed by actors belonging to a com-
munity of users that govern resources according to their 
own rules and norms, will also themselves be mediated by 
the characteristics of the commons. From this perspective, 
innovation is not an external factor affecting an otherwise 
non-technological commons, nor is it just a knowledge 
common, but should rather be understood as a shift from 
one socio-technical constellation of a commons to another 
one. Co-production should hence be interpreted as an ana-
lytical framework that is useful in drawing attention to the 
different ways in which innovation, commons, and govern-
ance interact. It is such a framework, so we argue in this 
article, that allows for better understanding the relation 
between innovation and the commons.
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